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This study investigates the inﬂuence of CFO roles on the implementation of ERM initiatives in a sample of
Nigerian ﬁnancial institutions (between 2013-2017). We develop three distinct factors representing the CFO roles
namely CFO power, CFO experience and CFO knowledge using principal component factoring. Like prior work,
we measure ERM components simultaneously to capture the extent of sophisticated ERM system. Our ﬁndings
pose that the CFO involvement in ERM implementation remains minimal while the CRO is solely responsible for
ERM implementation, which could undermine cost-beneﬁt effectiveness. Our empirical evidence reports that the
sophisticated ERM only promote the market evaluation while the accounting performance is undermined. The
result then contravenes the expectation that effective ERM enhances accounting performance by mitigating risk
exposure. While the sophisticated ERM is signiﬁcantly positive with leverage, which reveals that ERM imple-
mentation does not necessarily reduce the ﬁrm risk. This indicates that the ERM implementation remains inef-
fective to mitigate risks, where the CFO involvement in the ERM initiative is limited. We then advocate that CFOs
should be allowed to contribute strongly on some speciﬁc aspects of ERM initiatives namely identiﬁcation and
analysis of key risk indicators, the ﬁnancial implication of risks and integration of ERM into traditional ﬁnance
activities.1. Introduction
With the complexity of the business environment, management seeks
to mitigate risks and the ability of ﬁrms to identify those risks early has
formed part of the critical success factor (Soltanizadeh et al., 2014). This
discretion in identifying and managing risk has resulted in the applica-
tion of different approaches in mitigating such risks. Different in-
terpretations and approaches to mitigating risks have undermined the
effective managing risks, which are basically based on prior knowledge,
organizational roles and industry (IFAC, 2018; Ojeka et al., 2017a). For
instance, the measurement and assessment of risk have been a predom-
inantly quantitative exercise designed to avoid loss or fraud in ﬁnancial
institutions. Since the ﬁnancial crisis, the adopted approach is tailored to
adequately inform decisions and manage uncertainty. Risk management
is viewed as activities to prevent rather than processes to retorting crisis.
However, the arising challenge with applying this pattern of risk man-
agement, which relies solely on mitigating risks increases cost while thegboye).
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(IFAC, 2018).
Enterprise Risk Management (henceforth ERM) is gaining ground
among the practitioners and ﬁrms adopt it to identify and mitigate risk
holistically. ERM approaches risk beyond silo-based view (Gordon et al.,
2009). ERM requires the integration of different aspects of an organiza-
tion and multiple procedures to collectively comprehend the level of an
organization's exposure to uncertainties, which could distort the business
objectives and the prospects for growth. ERM analyzes available infor-
mation, which identiﬁes the success or failures of uncertainties while
decisions are based on the potential courses of action. The key goal of risk
management is to increase shareholders' value (COSO, 2004; Pagach and
Warr, 2011; Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003). Beyond effective management
decisions, ERM could foster more efﬁcient capital allocation (Myers and
Read, 2001), strong capital structure decision (Graham and Rogers,
2002), well-informed risk management decisions (Cummins, et al., 2001)
and create risk responsiveness, which advances operational and strategic019
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Prior corporate failures have necessitated the need for effective risk
management strategies. These corporate failures could be traced to
ineffective risk management and corporate governance while corporate
governance and risk management are intertwined (Quon et al., 2012;
Sprcic et al., 2015). Similarly, the stability of a company's performance is
highly dependent on the effective role of the board (Bromiley et al.,
2015). Risk management practice has recently extended beyond risk
transfer through insurance and hedging of ﬁnancial exposure or vola-
tility. Some companies now appoint Chief Risk Ofﬁcer who is saddled
with risk management responsibility, who either reports to the Chief
Financial Ofﬁcer, Chief Executive Ofﬁcer or directly to the board (Sprcic
et al., 2015). The development of ERM and its impact inﬂuence on
business performance propose that the business growth cannot rely solely
on traditional business strategies (Nor et al., 2016). The board also
comprehends how uncertainties could inﬂuence the business strategy.
A strand of literature has emerged examining the effectiveness of
ERM adoption. A handful of studies investigates the value of ERM proxies
to the appointment of CROs (Beasley, Pagach &Warr, 2008; Pagach and
Warr, 2011). Some works of literature consider the determinants of ﬁrm
management risk management endeavours and reveal an increase in
adoption of ERM and the appointment of CROs in different industries.
Colquitt et al. (1999) opine that ERM is common in ﬁnancial institutions.
A study by Liebenberg and Hoyt (2003) avers highly leveraged ﬁrms
possibly appoint Chief Risk Ofﬁcers (CROs) as a signal for effective risk
management efforts. In addition, Pagach and Warr (2011) opine that
organizations with high leverage, aggressive earning volatility, low stock
performance and linear relationship with CEOs' compensation and stock
volatility tend toward having a CRO. However, the study of Beasley et al.
(2005) examines the relationship between ERM and performance, which
poses that market reaction to appointing CRO is insigniﬁcant for some
ﬁrms while is signiﬁcant for some set of ﬁrms. In contrast, Hoyt and
Liebenberg (2011) elucidate that there is a positive relationship between
the ﬁrm value and the appointment of CRO. Studies tend to focus more on
the CRO as evident for effective risk management in a ﬁrm.
The key question in corporate governance that remains unanswered is
that; does Chief Financial Ofﬁcer (henceforth CFO) role matter in en-
terprise risk management initiatives? Beyond the periodic disclosure of
the ﬁnancial report, most companies consider CFOs next to the Chief
Executive Ofﬁcer in any public interaction (Caglio et al., 2018).
Currently, the clamour for the active involvement of CFOs in major
business decisions beyond ﬁnancial performance disclosure and other
functional roles is increasingly ampliﬁed. CFOs now actively involved in
the formulating and executing the organizational strategy (Datta and
Datta, 2014). CFOs are companies' ﬁnancial stewards who are basically
charged to prepare ﬁnancial reports and involve in strategy planning and
assist in the company policies formulations (Duong and Evans, 2015). As
a member of the senior executive team, they sometimes sit on the board
and contribute to decisions making.
The demand for CFO in strategy, performance and risk management is
increasingly gaining attention from the practitioners. Based on the report
by International Federation of Accountants (2018), CFO roles encom-
passes risk management approaches ranging from project appraisals
proposal concerning both ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial implications; make
forecasts based on key performance indicators of value and cost; identi-
fying risks and risk analysis through sensitivity analysis and scenario
modelling. In essence, the CFO is not expected to solely mitigate risks but
through value creation and preservation promotes effective risk man-
agement. In addition to mitigating and controlling risk, the CFO can
facilitate “intelligent risk-taking” endeavours (IFAC, 2018). The CFO
tends to provide needful information based on the drawn data and ac-
tivities of the organization and act as "spider in the web". Globally, the
complexity of business environment requires the role of CFO especially in
risk management to foster, which is not based only on speciﬁc risk such
as ﬁnancial risk but encompasses other risks. Furthermore, Cohen,
Krishnamoorthy and Wright (2014a) suggest that CFO plays a large role2with ERM.
However, there are little empirical studies validating the role of CFOs
on risk management (KPMG, 2013; Clyburn, 2012), which this study
tends to explore. We focus on the moderating effect of CFO roles on
enterprise risk management practices and ﬁrm performance. To identify
the role of CFO, we construct a CFO index following the prior study
(Caglio et al., 2018). Caglio et al. (2018) only examine the relationship
between the CFOs roles and CFOs compensation while we explore the
effect of CFOs role on enterprise risk management. We then further
develop three distinct factors representing the CFO roles namely; CFO
power, CFO experience and CFO knowledge using principal component
factoring. The essence of the index tends to eliminate any effect of
multicollinearity (Tarchouna et al., 2017). In addition, we investigate the
extent of ERM implementations on the ﬁrm performance while moder-
ating the effect of CFO roles. Based on the extracted data from
thirty-three (33) ﬁnancial institutions in Nigeria with timeframe
2013–2014. We ﬁnd that the CFO involvement in ERM implementation
remains minimal while the CRO is solely responsible for ERM imple-
mentation, which could undermine cost-beneﬁt effectiveness. Moreover,
the study further examines the inﬂuence of sophisticated ERM on ﬁrm
performance while moderating the effect of CFO. We ﬁnd that ERM fo-
cuses basically on market evaluation while minimizing accounting-based
performance signiﬁcantly. We then advocate that CFOs should be
allowed to contribute strongly on some speciﬁc aspects of ERM initiatives
namely identiﬁcation and analysis of key risk indicators, the ﬁnancial
implication of risks and integration of ERM into traditional ﬁnance
activities.
This study contributes to the emerging studies on ERM implementa-
tion by exploring the inﬂuence of CFOs on risk management. This paper
is unique as we consider the importance of CRO on risk management
strategies. This study ﬁrst extends the prior studies by examining the
inﬂuence of diverse CFO characteristics on ERM thereby contributing to
the limited literature on the subject-matter in Nigeria context. In addi-
tion, this study tends to help the practitioners to reprioritize the necessity
for engaging the CFO on risk management endeavours. In furtherance of
achieving global relevance in emerging countries, this study will help the
policymakers in emphasizing on the role of CFOs in risk strategy
decisions.
The remainder of this paper is patterned as follows: Section 2 deals
with the literature reviews, why the focus on ﬁnancial institutions and
the roles of CFO in ERM initiatives. Section 3 undertakes the research
design and methodology. Section 4 presents descriptive statistics and
empirical analysis results. Section 5 reports the additional analysis un-
dertaken with the robustness analysis. Section 6 makes the ﬁnal con-
clusions and suggestions.
2. Literature review
This study emphasizes on the ﬁnancial institutions because agency
theory asserts that the executives could have minimal risk appetite
compared to shareholders as their short-term beneﬁts of control and
undiversiﬁable human capital investments of the ﬁrm are at stake (Faleye
and Krishnan, 2010). Interestingly in the case of bank bankruptcy,
managers also have the tendency to lose invested wealth in the ﬁrm
(Devriese et al., 2004). Generally, ﬁnancial institutions are more lever-
aged compared to non-ﬁnancial institutions in which the level of board
risk appetite to maximize shareholders wealth could increase the chance
of ﬁasco. However, ﬁnancial institutions are exposed to various ﬁnancial
risks such as credit, interest rate and counterparty risks, which reﬂects
their exclusive position as ﬁnancial intermediaries. Thus, the excessive
risk appetite of banks could have signiﬁcant negative externalities on the
macroeconomic and systemic risk, which encourage a highly regulated
environment for ﬁnancial institutions (Haan and Vlahu, 2012). Recently,
corporate collapses have contributed signiﬁcantly to the ﬁnancial market
insecurity globally, which has triggered diverse regulatory responses
(Salim et al., 2016).
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There are diverse enterprise risk management frameworks. However,
the most popular and generally accepted ones are AS/NZS 4360 put
forward by Australian and New Zealand's Risk management standards
and COSO (2004) formulated by the committee of Sponsoring Organi-
zations of the Treadway Commissions (Soltanizadeh et al., 2014). Ac-
cording to the Committee of Sponsoring Organization of the Treadway
Commission (henceforth COSO), the enterprise risk management as:
“a process, effected by an entity's board of directors, management and
other personnel, applied in strategy setting and across the enterprise,
designed to identify potential events that may affect the entity, and
manage risk to be within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable
assurance regarding the achievement of entity objectives” (COSO,
2004).
Saeidi et al. (2019) recognize eight risk management elements, which
include internal environment as it factors in the internal policies phi-
losophies and values of the ﬁrm, setting of objectives, identiﬁcation of
possible losses and opportunities that might hinder the ﬁrm from
achieving set goals, assessing of impact of risks on the ﬁrms performance,
determination of the appropriate way of dealing with risk and losses,
control activities, communication of information across the ﬁrm to
enable achievement of goals, monitoring and evaluation of enterprise
risk management. They concluded that enterprise risk management as
given by COSO (2004) would help a ﬁrm achieve both short and long
term goals, the accuracy of reporting as well as a high level of compliance
with regulations. Tekathen and Dechow (2013) opined that COSO (2004)
has dimensional model which states that the top-down approach to risk
management by stating that hierarchal positions should be used to deﬁne
managerial responsibilities, adherence to ﬁrms policies and laws by
managers and personnel alike should be measured using code of
compliance, audibility is of great advantage to the ﬁrm. Standards Aus-
tralia/Standards New Zealand AS/NZS 4360 (2004) has cited by Bro-
miley et al. (2015) explains enterprise risk management as all activities
embarked by a ﬁrm to ensure the proper management of opportunities
and the effective management of the adverse effects that arise from the
said opportunities. The two frameworks are different in terms of under-
standing and deﬁnition of enterprise risk management are considered has
identiﬁed by prior studies (Brown et al., 2009; Hill, 2008). Enterprise risk
management as deﬁned by (Hill, 2008), bringing both COSO (2004) and
Standards Australia/Standards New Zealand AS/NZS 4360 (2004)
together as
“the principles of deﬁne, identify, analyze, treat, report and monitor
risks are fundamentally the same even though the number of steps
and terminology may change.”
Prior studies have basically focused on the implementation of enter-
prise resource planning, the concept which is no longer so new is ex-
pected to have grown beyond the implementation stage. In addition, after
the implementation stage, a large number of studies indicate that ﬁrms
employ the services of a Chief Risk Ofﬁcer whose main job is enabling the
efﬁcient and effective governance of risk in enterprise risk management
without factoring in the signiﬁcance and advantages the presence of a
chief ﬁnancial ofﬁcer whose duty involves tracking cash ﬂow, ﬁnancial
planning as well as determining the ﬁrm's ﬁnancial strength and weak-
nesses and proposing corrective action brings to enterprise risk man-
agement. However, the question of to what extent does the involvement
of a Chief Financial Ofﬁcer affect enterprise risk management remains
unanswered.2.2. Enterprise risk management
The risk was managed separately and handled by different de-
partments until the risk management revolution of the 70s, headed by3Kloman (2010) when he suggests that risk should be managed holisti-
cally, which is reiterated by researchers and practitioners alike. Crock-
ford (1980) opines that the process and strategy used for risk
management should cut across industries and not just restricted to de-
partments or speciﬁc companies. Bannister and Bawcutt (1981) further
aver future uncertainty is better managed and curbed if industries and
professions commonly develop a speciﬁc framework. Haimes (1992)
posits that before resource allocation is done, risk management decisions
must be considered. The ﬁrst ofﬁcial deﬁnition of enterprise risk man-
agement provided by Dickinson (2001) ascertains the concepts of risk
management in the mid-90s. However, the ﬁrst wildly accepted deﬁni-
tion was provided by Darcy and Brogan (2001), which involves the in-
crease in entity's value both short and long term through the effective
assess, proper control, intense exploitation, efﬁcient ﬁnancing and
adequate monitoring of risks across all industries. The committee of
Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commissions (COSO, 2004)
identify risk management as the process which affects the management,
personnel and board of directors of an entity and it is basically designed
to identify, tackle and manage situations that might have a negative ef-
fect on the entity and its risk appetite. This is applicable to every
department and section of the entity and includes the strategy-setting
process to enable the ultimate achievement of the set goals and
objectives.
Studies have considered the effect of enterprise risk management on
various factors. Renault et al. (2016) posit that enterprise risk manage-
ment implementation reduces cost and curbs earnings volatility, which
eventually increase competitive advantage. Tekathen and Dechow
(2013) conclude that enterprise risk management is not the ultimate
solution to curbing risks but it simply provides an avenue by which risk
could be managed appropriately. Ahmad et al. (2014) using survey
questionnaires identify that companies' risk management strategy have
proactive beneﬁt by the reduction of losses and cost. They also note that a
large number of ﬁrms hire Chief Risk Ofﬁcers and could help the enter-
prise resource management decisions before asset allocation. Quon,
Zeghal and Maingot (2012) using survey questionnaires identify that
adoption and implementation of enterprise risk management help com-
panies better prepare and hedge for risk. Florio and Leoni (2017) suggest
that the implementation of enterprise risk management inﬂuences ﬁrm
performance positively as well as market evaluation. Kashif, Lai and Lai
(2019) ﬁnd that the implementation of enterprise risk management
promotes a ﬁrms value as well as its competitiveness. Fraser and Simkins
(2016) opine that enterprise risk management helps the functionality of a
ﬁrm positively. Saeidi et al. (2019) recognize that the implementation of
enterprise risk management helps improve the ﬁrm's competitive
advantage. Kleffner, LEE, & McGannon (2003) identify that after the
implementation of enterprise risk management, the Chief Risk Manager
has a big role to play in its success.
2.3. Roles of chief ﬁnancial ofﬁcer
The success of the adoption and implementation of enterprise risk
management goes beyond the Chief Executive Ofﬁcers commitment but
as well as every member of the management team. To achieve the stra-
tegic objectives of the ﬁrm, the signiﬁcant contribution of the Chief
Financial ofﬁcer especially on risk management is needful (IFAC, 2018).
The chief ﬁnance ofﬁcer is simply as an individual in charge of monitory
of cash ﬂow, ﬁnancial planning and preparation of the ﬁnancial report. In
addition, the CRO role has encompassed the determination of the ﬁrm's
ﬁnancial capacity and provision of corrective action to effectively and
efﬁciently navigate ﬁrm's risk (Hoitash et al., 2016). Datta and Datta
(2014) suggest that CFO has more to offer in the adoption of enterprise
risk management as the CEO and could provide expert knowledge on risk
and ﬁnancial opportunities available to the ﬁrm, cash control, capital
budgeting, external ﬁnancing as well as capital investment.
Each ﬁrm has respective speciﬁc ﬁnance modules and it is based on
these modules that enterprise risk management is adopted. With the
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role to play in the adoption of enterprise risk management (Caglio et al.,
2018). The adoption of enterprise risk management requires resources
such as capital, operation cost as well as intensive analysis of the prob-
ability of adoption being successful. The allocation of such resources
would require the expert opinion of the CFO before strategic decisions
are made. In addition, the CFO has a bigger role to play in enterprise risk
management adoption in ﬁrms where there exist no Chief Information
Ofﬁcer. CFO tends to take the responsibilities of the Chief Information
Ofﬁcer, by giving adequate information beyond ﬁnance and Account but
encompassing IT decisions that are strategic in nature, which involve the
responsibility of enterprise risk management implementation (Hiebl
et al., 2017).
We postulate the following hypotheses;
H1. There is a positive relationship between CFO power and Enterprise
Risk Management.
H2. There is a positive relationship between CFO Experience and En-
terprise Risk Management.
H3. There is a positive relationship between CFO Knowledge and En-
terprise Risk Management.
3. Methodology
3.1. Sample
We test our postulated hypotheses on the ﬁnancial service companies
listed on the Nigerian Stock Market. We draw thirty-three (33) com-
panies from the ﬁfty-seven (57) ﬁnancial institutions after ﬁltering
criteria are adopted. We drop ﬁrms with insufﬁcient variables desired for
this study. In addition, ﬁrms with at least ﬁve (5) consecutive data are
selected, which allow for the robustness of results (Petersen, 2009). The
desired variables are hand-collected from the annual reports and the
corporate governance section of the ﬁrms' websites. We consider ﬁve (5)
years from 2013-2107 because the ﬁrms have fully implemented and
disclosed all reports on Enterprise Risk Management following the Cen-
tral Bank of Nigeria directives.3.2. Measures
As mentioned earlier, this study emphasizes the CFO characteristics
as the primary explanatory variable of ERM. This paper absorbs a
quantitative content analysis of the annual reports to obtain information
about companies' enterprise risk management practices and CFO char-
acteristics. Following prior studies (Datta and Datta, 2014; Bedard et al.,
2014; Caglio et al., 2018) and utilizing publicly available data, we
hand-collect data relating to the CFO characteristics, which include CFO
educational background (has MBA or equivalent), the CFO professional
experience (i.e. has experience in auditing or consulting) with possession
of any accounting professional certiﬁcation (ACA, ACCA or CPA). These
data tend to reveal the CFO with or without managerial competence
(Datta and Datta, 2014) and with or without accounting background
(Bedard et al., 2014). We also examine the level of CFO directorship that
is if the CFO is on the board or not. To expand the prior studies on CFO
characteristics solely based on managerial competence, we further follow
the echelon theory, which theorizes the demographic characteristic that
is CFO gender and CFO education.
A study by Bedard et al. (2014) poses that CFO on the board poten-
tially exerts greater inﬂuence onmanagement decisions. In aggregate, we
have seven variables proxy for CFO characteristics; where four variables
represent the CFO competence and experience that is professional cer-
tiﬁcation, education, audit experience and consultancy experience. Also,
one variable related to the CFO gender, another variable on CFO direc-
torship and CFO retention.
The reliable measure for ERM has been quite challenging, which4indicates the encompassing sophistication involved. To this end, prior
studies (Beasley et al., 2005; Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2011; Liebenberg and
Hoyt, 2003; Pagach and Warr, 2011) has adopted the appointment of
CRO to signify the effective implementation of ERM or Risk Committee or
relying on the content analysis in the annual reports of companies
(Bertinetti et al., 2013; Gordon et al., 2009). Following the study of Florio
and Leoni (2016), we adopt their ERM measure, which uses a two-step
approach. This approach is consistent with a proper integrated ERM.
The ﬁrst approach sums all the identiﬁed indicators of ERM components,
which include; if the annual report contains the risk management
(RiskReport), the existence of CRO in the ﬁrms (CROx), possibility of the
company designating speciﬁc risk management activities to risk com-
mittee (RCommittee), the interference of the board in the ﬁrm's risk
management activities (RBoard), the timeliness of the risk assessment
procedures (Rfrequency), inclusive risk assessment procedure (Rlevel),
and if the ﬁrm adopts both qualitative and quantitative methods (Rme-
thod). The ERM score (ERMsco) ranges from 0 to 6, then we adopt a bi-
nary variable for ERMsopH, which equals 1 if ERMsco is higher than 3 and
0 otherwise.
We further apply control variables, which comprise the ﬁrm's char-
acteristic that is the ﬁrm size (Size). The ﬁrm size could affect the risk
appetite and the resource available for ERM implementation (Baxter
et al., 2013). In addition, we control for the ﬁrm leverage (leverage) and
the return on equity (ROE) for market valuation modelling. The leverage
controls for the ambiguous relationship between the capital structure and
market evaluation, while ROE is expected to relate positively with the
market performance by reduction of risk exposure. We control for
corporate governance comprising of Board size. All variables included in
the model is explained in Table 1.3.3. Models
We use OLS regression with company and year controls to test the
inﬂuence of CFO roles on the Enterprise Risk Management. In addition,
we also apply logistic regression as a result of adopting a binary variable
for ERMsopH, which equals 1 if ERMsco is higher than 3 and 0 otherwise.
Thus, we use Model 1 in an acceptable form to achieve our objectives.
ERMit ¼ β0 þ
X
β1CFOrolesit þ β2Controlsit þ εit (1)
We further regress the impact of ERM Sophistication on the ﬁrm
performance, which is proxied by ROA (Accounting-Based Measure) and
Tobin Q (Market-Based Measure) while we examine the CFO moderating
effect alongside.
Performanceit ¼ β0 þ β2ERMit þ β3Controlsit þ εit (2)
4. Results
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the exogenous and
endogenous variables divided into Panel A - continuous and Panel B -
dichotomous variables.
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the proxied CFO vari-
ables. The data indicates that 96% of the CFOs possess any accounting
professional certiﬁcation (ACCA, ACA or CIMA) while 61% have audit
experience, with 46% possess MBA certiﬁcate or equivalent. In addition,
32% of the CFOs have consulting experience with 10% part of the board
of directors and 72% are retained their position in subsequent years.
Regarding the adopted control variables, the CFOs are largely male
with closely 83% while the average number of board magnitude in our
sample is approximately 11 members. The data reports low proﬁtability
on average with average ROA equal to 2% and mean ROE equals 10% as
some observations have strong negative performance.
The mean Tobin's Q is less than 1, signalling mismatch between the
Table 1
Description of variables.
Variables Measurement
ERM Sophistication
RiskReport Dummy variable equal to one if the ﬁrm has a risk management
report in its annual report, and 0 otherwise
CROx Dummy variable equal to 1 if the company has designated a chief
risk ofﬁcer or an ICR ofﬁcer, and 0 otherwise [CG Report] Example
of CRO ¼ 1:
RCommittee Dummy variable equal to 1 if the company has designated a
speciﬁc risk committee or an ICR committee, and 0 otherwise
[Corporate Governance Report] Example of RiskCommittee ¼ 1
RBoard Dummy variable equal to 1 if the Corporate Governance body
responsible for risk management, i.e., the speciﬁc risk committee
or the ICR committee or, these two lackings, the IC committee,
refers to the BoD at least biannually, and 0 otherwise [CG Report]
Example of RCtoBoD ¼ 1
Rfrequency Dummy variable equal to 1 if the company performs the risk
assessment procedure at least biannually, and 0 otherwise [CG
Report] Example of RAfrequency ¼ 1
Rlevel Dummy variable equal to 1 if the company carries out the risk
assessment procedure at a level lower than the overall company
(e.g., by business unit or function), and 0 otherwise [CG Report]
Examples of RAlevel ¼ 1
Rmethod Dummy variable equal to 1 if the company adopts both qualitative
and quantitative methods of risk assessment, and 0 otherwise [CG
Report] Example of RAmethod ¼ 1
ERMsco Sum of the following variables: CRO, RiskCommittee, RCtoBoD,
RAfrequency, RAlevel, RAmethod.
ERMsopH Dummy variable equal to 1 if ERMscore is equal to or higher than
4, and 0 otherwise
CFO characteristics
Expertise Variable equal to 1 if the CFO has Recognized Accounting
Professional Qualiﬁcation, 0 otherwise
AuditExp Variable equal to 1 if the CFO has some experience in an audit
company during his/her career, 0 otherwise
Education Variable equal to 1 if the CFO has an MBA, 0 otherwise
ConsultExp Variable equal to 1 if the CFO has some experience in a consulting
company during his/her career, 0 otherwise
Directorship Variable equal to 1 if the CFO sits on the Board, 0 otherwise
CFO gender Variable equal to 1 if the CFO is male, 0 otherwise
Retention variable equal to 1 if the CFO is the same person in YEARt as in
YEAR(t-1), 0 otherwise
Control Variables
ROA Proﬁt after Taxation divided by Total Asset of the ﬁrm
Tobin Q The book value of total assets minus the book values of equity plus
the market value of equity all divided by the book value of total
assets.
Leverage Total Debt/Total Common Equity
Firm size The natural logarithm total assets of the ﬁrm
Board
Magnitude
The total number of members on the board
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leverage is 27%, the mean of the log ﬁrms' asset is 18.33%.
Panel B of Table 2 presents the frequency distribution of the ERM
components. The 78% of CRO exist in our sample indicating large CRO
ofﬁcers similar to U.S. ﬁrms (Desender, 2011). In addition, 96% of our
sample have a more dedicated presence of Risk committee. Similar to
Florio and Leoni (2017), 93.87% of Risk Committee reports to the Board
of Directors at minimum biannually. None of the samples performs risk
assessment at least biannually while 77.91% of the companies perform a
risk assessment to lower level than the overall corporate. All the com-
panies adopt both qualitative and quantitative methods in risk assess-
ment while 87.27% have more than the ERM components combined.
Various aspects of the CFO role tends to be complimentary (Caglio
et al., 2018) and could lead to multicollinearity statistical problem.
Therefore, we do not categorize CFO roles as an either managerial or
ﬁduciary duty. However, we employ factor analysis to condense six
variables relating to CFO roles. Panel A of Table 3 reports the correlation
matrix of the CFO roles variables. The correlation coefﬁcients are weak,
which indicate that the proxies capture diverse structures of the CFO5roles (Adams and Veprauskait, 2013). Panel B further shows the factor
analysis of various aspects of CFO roles relative to each other. The factor
with or without varimax rotation extracts three factors with eigenvalue
exceeding 1. Therefore, we extract the factor grouping to generate cat-
egories of CFO roles. We create CFO Power, which characterized by CFO
expertise, directorship and retention of position. While the CFO experi-
ence contains CFO consulting experience and auditing experience and
the CFO knowledge contains CFO education possessing MBA or
equivalent.
Table 4 reports the differences in ERM sophistication between CFO on
the board and the CFO serving as management team only. The two cat-
egories contain ﬁrm-year observations with different ERM sophisticat-
ion. Results in Table 4 present that the ERM sophistication (ERMsopH)
where the CFO seats on Board are signiﬁcantly higher than the ERM
sophistication of CFOs not on the board. The average ERM sophistication
of CFO on board is 4.938, while 4.412 for CFO not on the Board. This
implies that the CFO position is negatively related to ERM sophistication.
4.2. Correlations
Table 5 presents the correlation coefﬁcient of our desired variables.
From the table, it appears that two ERM measures are highly correlated
with each other. To avoid any multicollinearity statistical problem, we
use each of them in dissimilar regression speciﬁcations, which enhance
the robustness of our study. The proxy for CFO roles (CFO Power; CFO
Experience and CFO Knowledge) is positively correlated with ERM
implementation (ERMsco and ERMsopH), which align with our expecta-
tions. Similarly, the table presents a low correlation among the variables.
Hence, there is no suggestion for multicollinearity statistical problem in
the models.
4.3. Main ﬁndings
Column 1 of Table 6 reports the effect of various CFO roles on the
ERM sophistication (ERMsco). The results reveal a positive relationship
between the CFO roles on ERM implementation except for the audit
experience (AuditExp), which present a negative inﬂuence on ERM while
control variables exempted. However, only the consulting experience
and the director that are positive signiﬁcant on the ERM implementation.
This implies that the CFO on the board and their consulting contribute
positively on the ERM sophistication (see Table 7).
H1, H2, H3 presume that CFO roles are positively associated with ERM
sophistication. Table 6 reveals the statistical results. To test whether CFO
roles contribute positively to the ERM implementation, while ERM
implementation (ERMsco) is the dependent variable. From column 2 of
Table 6, the coefﬁcient of CFO power is positively associated with the
ERM sophistication supporting our H1. However, the relationship re-
mains insigniﬁcant. Column 3 reports the inﬂuence of CFO experience on
the ERM implementation supporting the presumed H2. These results
signal the passive contribution of CFO roles on the ERM implementation.
This result commensurate with the idea that CFOs are concerned with the
traditional ways to mitigate risks and less involved with the ERM
implementations in the Nigerian context.
Furthermore, column 5 include the inﬂuence of CRO position on the
ERM sophistication and the results report a positively signiﬁcant asso-
ciation with ERM implementation (at p-value<0.001). Such results align
with prior studies (Ahmad et al., 2014; Beasley et al., 2005; Cohen,
Krishnamoorthy and Wright, 2014b). This result suggests that the full
responsibility of ERM implementation is solely on the Chief Risk Ofﬁcer
while the input of the CFO is minimal. Therefore, we argue that the
involvement of CFO in the implementation of EFM could be more
effective and less costing.
Regarding the control variables, the ERM sophistication is positively
associated with the board magnitude (the number of board members),
with the Tobin Q (the market-based performance measurement), with
the leverage and with the ﬁrm size, which positively signiﬁcant (at p-
Table 2
Descriptive statistics.
Panel A: Statistical Summary
Variable N Mean Median SD 25% 75%
CFO-role
Expertise 164 0.96 1.00 0.20 1.00 1.00
AuditExp 164 0.61 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00
Education 164 0.46 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00
Consult 164 0.32 0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00
Directorship 164 0.10 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.00
Retention 164 0.72 1.00 0.38 0.00 1.00
Control Variables
CFO gender 164 0.83 1.00 0.38 1.00 1.00
Board Magnitude 164 11.23 11.00 3.68 8.00 14.00
TobinQ 164 0.93 0.92 0.25 0.84 1.03
ROA 164 0.02 0.02 0.063 0.01 0.03
ROE 164 0.10 0.08 0.20 0.03 0.16
Leverage 164 0.27 0.22 0.37 0.22 0.40
Size 164 18.33 17.30 2.44 16.28 20.84
Panel B: Frequency distribution of the ERM components
Components Dichotomous Frequency 2013–2017 % 2013–2017
CROx 0 35 21.21
1 130 78.79
RCommittee 0 5 3.07
1 158 96.93
RBoard 0 10 6.13
1 153 93.87
Rfrequency 0 163 100
Rlevel 0 36 22.09
1 127 77.91
Rmethod 1 164 100
ERMsopH 0 21 12.73
1 124 87.27
Table 3
CFO roles: Principal component factoring.
Panel A. Correlation 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Expert 1
2. AuditExp 0.110 1
3. Education 0.0808 0.125 1
4. ConsultExp 0.0768 0.112 0.0380 1
5. Directorship 0.263*** 0.243** 0.0251 0.0402 1
6. Retention 0.122 0.124 0.0744 0.119 0.159* 1
Panel B. Factor Analysis
Factor pattern Factor pattern with varimax rotation
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
CFO Power Experience Knowledge CFO Power Experience Knowledge
Expert 0.6030 0.3220 0.2757 ¡0.6838 0.2666 0.0678
Directorship 0.7166 0.1080 0.2021 0.7506 0.4600 0.0472
Retention 0.4837 0.4830 0.2768 0.5021 0.0232 0.3650
Consult 0.0657 0.7533 0.3931 0.1232 0.8425 0.0362
AuditExp 0.6215 0.1404 0.4341 0.4434 0.4600 0.4316
Education 0.2102 0.4700 0.7105 0.0210 0.0316 0.8766
Eigenvalue 1.545891 1.15677 1.04128 1.495 1.152 1.096
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Differences in ERM sophistication between the two subsamples.
CFO not on Board CFO seats on Board Test of Difference
Dif. t
ERMsco 0.864 1 0.136 1.578
ERMsopH 4.412 4.938 0.525** 2.274
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
6ﬁrms tend to implement ERM aggressively with the assumption that
larger ﬁrms encounter more risks compared to smaller ﬁrms.
5. Robustness analysis
5.1. CFO roles and operational ERM components
In the main analysis, we condense six components developed by
Florio and Leoni (2017) to capture the holistic perspective of risk man-
agement. Now we consider two distinct components namely designated
responsibility to Risk committee (RCommittee) and involvement of lower
Table 5
Correlation matrix.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1. ERMsco 1
2. ERMsopH 0.812*** 1
3. Power 0.160* 0.155 1
4. Experience 0.147 0.0501 0.0116 1
5. Knowledge 0.0805 0.135 0.00325 0.0127 1
6. TobinQ 0.201* 0.174* 0.0961 0.275*** 0.0274 1
7. ROA 0.224** 0.115 0.0311 0.238** 0.104 0.451*** 1
8. Leverage 0.214** 0.172* 0.0411 0.175* 0.268*** 0.352*** 0.564*** 1
9. Bsize 0.309*** 0.201* 0.357*** 0.0679 0.157* 0.0402 0.00804 0.133 1
10. Size 0.356*** 0.290*** 0.281*** 0.233** 0.215** 0.121 0.0390 0.221** 0.617*** 1
11. CFO gender 0.0391 0.113 0.0926 0.144 0.221** 0.0234 0.0631 0.0974 0.0274 0.0410 1
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
Table 6
Multivariate Analysis of CFO Roles on ERM score.
OLS 1 2 3 4 5
CFO Roles
Expertise 0.137
(0.343)
AuditExp 0.106
(0.134)
Educate 0.0892
(0.126)
Consult 0.386***
(0.136)
Director 0.430*
(0.222)
Retention 0.0166
(0.142)
CFO Power 0.0128 0.0604
(0.0633) (0.0448)
CFO
Experience
0.0172 0.0880*
(0.0637) (0.0455)
CFO
Knowledge
0.00837 0.0517
(0.0631) (0.0449)
CRO 1.478***
(0.118)
Control Variables
Board
Magnitude
0.0302 0.0316 0.0313 0.0148
(0.0211) (0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0150)
CFO gender 0.118 0.127 0.117 0.156
(0.156) (0.157) (0.158) (0.113)
TobinQ 0.210 0.201 0.211 0.0656
(0.271) (0.274) (0.271) (0.194)
ROA 2.691** 2.648** 2.699** 0.543
(1.229) (1.243) (1.228) (0.911)
Leverage 0.00207 0.00218 0.00516 0.153
(0.201) (0.201) (0.205) (0.145)
Size 0.0894*** 0.0879*** 0.0904*** 0.00910
(0.0318) (0.0325) (0.0318) (0.0244)
Constant 2.466*** 2.491*** 2.431*** 3.342***
(0.524) (0.541) (0.521) (0.404)
Observations 160 160 160 160
R-squared 0.204 0.204 0.204 0.614
rmse 0.738 0.738 0.738 0.519
F-test 5.565 5.571 5.561 23.70
Prob > F 1.01e05 9.95e06 1.02e05 0
Standard errors in parentheses ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
Table 7
Additional analysis.
Risk Committee Risk Level
Logit 1 2 1 2 3
CFO Power 0.218 0.447
(0.982) (0.307)
CFO Experience 2.403 0.210
(1.987) (0.245)
CFO Knowledge 0.114
(0.227)
Control Variables
TobinQ 4.370** 7.365* 2.573** 2.522** 2.526**
(2.225) (3.763) (1.121) (1.119) (1.121)
ROA 32.31** 40.19** 5.650 6.334 5.599
(13.35) (17.35) (4.025) (4.131) (4.011)
Leverage 0.328 0.558 0.725 0.769 0.838
(2.711) (3.204) (0.898) (0.951) (0.946)
Size 0.228 0.219 0.158 0.181* 0.206**
(0.313) (0.335) (0.104) (0.106) (0.105)
Constant 5.428 9.815 4.029** 4.444** 4.944**
(6.071) (7.458) (2.005) (2.031) (1.974)
Observations 161 161 161 161 161
Pseudo R-
squared
0.270 0.332 0.129 0.118 0.115
chi-squared 10.11 12.43 21.70 19.88 19.39
Prob > chi2 0.0721 0.0294 0.000596 0.00131 0.00163
Standard errors in parentheses ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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nents because of the presence of multicollinearity statistical problem.
Interestingly, we ﬁnd that CFO roles contribute passively to the ﬁrms'
ERM implementation. This is not surprising as organizations tend to
delegate the activities of the ERM to solely CRO, which undermine the
power, knowledge and experience of CFO relating to the ERM
endeavours.75.2. CFO roles and the alternative ERM sophistication measure
To validate results obtained in the main regression models, we further
test our formulated hypotheses altering the dependent variable. We
change the ERM sophistication (ERMsco) with ERMsopH, which adopts
binary variables (where ERMsopH equals to 1 if the ERMsco greater or
equal to 4 and 0 otherwise). We then use the ordinal logistic regression
model to address the formulated hypotheses. These results conﬁrm the
robustness of the main test as the desired variables retain their results
(see Table 8).5.3. Performance and risk appetite
Interestingly, empirical studies have extensively examined the asso-
ciation between ERM implementation and the ﬁrm performance (Florio
and Leoni, 2017; Mohammed and Knapkova, 2016; Nickmanesh et al.,
2013). The underlying assumption holds that ﬁrms with strong proﬁt-
ability could invest intensive resources in ERM activities, which suggests
a positive relationship between ERM implementation and ﬁrm perfor-
mance. Indeed, ERM implementation tends to minimize the companies'
risk exposure, which could enhance ﬁrm performance. Prior studies
(Baxter et al., 2013; Gordon et al., 2009; Pagach&Warr, 2010) claim that
risk reduction could prevent losses; bankruptcy and reputation risk.
However, Ellul & Yerramilli (2013) opine that extensive ERM could
Table 8
Multivariate analysis of ERM implementation (1¼ ERMsco4 or 0¼Otherwise)
and CFO roles.
Logit Regression 1 2 3 4 5
CFO Roles
AuditExp 0.159
(0.584)
Educate 1.222**
(0.612)
Consult 1.005
(0.674)
Retention 0.579
(0.546)
CFO Power 0.492 1.324
(0.490) (0.965)
CFO Experience 0.453 0.453
(0.412) (0.738)
CFO Knowledge 0.256 1.079
(0.348) (0.745)
CRO 6.581***
(1.609)
Bsize 0.137 0.181 0.123 0.0152
(0.125) (0.134) (0.129) (0.233)
sex 1.641 1.676 1.645 2.847*
(1.132) (1.157) (1.111) (1.475)
TobinQ 1.645 2.086 1.996 4.337
(1.373) (1.419) (1.451) (3.018)
ROA 3.500 4.359 3.395 15.44
(5.663) (5.736) (6.109) (10.56)
Leverage 0.556 0.466 0.281 0.350
(1.652) (1.504) (1.664) (2.113)
Size 0.384* 0.471** 0.390** 0.606
(0.201) (0.202) (0.198) (0.620)
Constant 0.985 5.800 8.182* 6.111 11.96
(0.683) (3.978) (4.214) (3.863) (11.71)
Observations 159 159 159 159 159
Pseudo R-squared 0.0749 0.225 0.225 0.219 0.691
chi-squared 8.064 25.23 25.29 24.62 77.63
Prob > chi2 0.0893 0.000690 0.000675 0.000886 0
Standard errors in parentheses ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
Table 9
ERM and ﬁrm performance.
OLS Tobin Q ROE ROA Leverage
ERMSco 0.0359 0.0337* 0.0128** 0.0674*
(0.0247) (0.0198) (0.00535) (0.0373)
CFO Power 0.0242 0.000781 0.00335 0.00143
(0.0194) (0.0157) (0.00424) (0.0299)
CFO Experience 0.0497*** 0.00648 0.0113*** 0.0496*
(0.0189) (0.0153) (0.00413) (0.0288)
CFO Knowledge 0.0136 0.0113 8.38e05 0.0890***
(0.0191) (0.0155) (0.00418) (0.0286)
Leverage 0.209*** 0.196*** 0.0938***
(0.0558) (0.0423) (0.0114)
ROE 0.00274
(0.0999)
Board Magnitude 0.00521 0.00759 1.61e05 0.00181
(0.00659) (0.00530) (0.00143) (0.0101)
Size 0.000691 0.0148* 0.00723*** 0.0149
(0.0101) (0.00810) (0.00219) (0.0154)
Constant 0.779*** 0.00872 0.0347 0.285
(0.167) (0.135) (0.0365) (0.256)
Observations 161 161 161 161
R-squared 0.192 0.162 0.401 0.140
rmse 0.228 0.184 0.0498 0.351
F-test 4.510 4.227 14.63 4.178
Prob > F 6.16e05 0.000273 0 0.000639
Standard errors in parentheses ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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on whether ERM implementation increases ﬁrm performance by taking
more risk or less (Nocco and Stulz, 2006).
In this perspective, we further examine the inﬂuence of sophisticated
ERM on the performance and risk appetite of ﬁrms. To achieve this
objective, we estimate OLS regression where the ﬁrm performance is
measured by market-based measure (TobinQ) and accounting based
measure (ROA & ROE) and its risk appetite is proxied by leverage and
sophisticated ERM (dummy variable) as an explanatory variable (see
results in Table 9). Our empirical evidence reports that the sophisticated
ERM only promote the market evaluation while the accounting perfor-
mance is undermined. The result then contravenes the expectation that
effective ERM enhances accounting performance by mitigating risk
exposure. While the ERMsopH is signiﬁcantly positive with leverage,
which reveals that ERM implementation does not necessarily reduce the
ﬁrm risk. This indicates that the ERM implementation remains ineffective
to mitigate risks contrary to prior studies ((Baxter et al., 2013; Gordon
et al., 2009; Pagach &Warr, 2010).
6. Conclusions
Studies investigating the contribution of CFO in ERM implementation
remain scanty. Therefore, this paper examines the extent of CFO roles in
the ERM implementation in a sample of Nigerian ﬁnancial ﬁrms within
the timeframe of 2013–2017 following the different Central Bank of
Nigeria directives to minimize risks in ﬁnancial institutions. This study is
patterned to reveal the contribution of CFO in the implementation of risk8assessment mechanisms, which is gaining increased attention of policy
makers, academicians and regulators. This study is basically motivated
by the International Federation of Accountants report titled "Enabling the
Accountant's Role in Effective Enterprise Risk Management”, which identiﬁes
the potential contribution of CFO to Enterprise Risk Management.
Moreover, this study shifts from developed economies to a developing
country, which is plagued with weak institutions (Adegbite, 2015; Ojeka
et al., 2017b). In the Nigerian context, CFOs are always part of the
management teams but hardly gain any position on the Board.
Following prior study (Florio and Leoni, 2017) on ERM sophisticat-
ion, we simultaneously adopt six distinct ERM components, which
distinguish the ﬁrms with more sophisticated ERM and less sophisticated
ERM. To achieve our main objective, we then condense the CFO roles
using principal factoring analysis, which are reduced to three main fac-
tors namely CFO power; CFO experience and CFO knowledge. Our
analysis validates that CFO roles seem passive relative to the sophisti-
cated ERM. We also ﬁnd that companies with CFO on the board tend to
have sophisticated ERM while companies without CFOs on the board
have less or no sophisticated ERM. This reveals the extent of the CFO
roles when ERM implementation is solely undertaken by CRO. Moreover,
the study further examines the inﬂuence of sophisticated ERM on ﬁrm
performance while moderating the effect of CFO. We ﬁnd that ERM fo-
cuses basically on market evaluation while minimizing accounting-based
performance signiﬁcantly. In addition, ERM adopted by ﬁrms progres-
sively increase leverage. This result shows that the extent of sophisticated
ERM is less effective to mitigate the level of risk, while the ERMsopH is
signiﬁcantly positive with leverage. These results pose that the CFO
involvement in ERM implementation remains minimal while the CRO is
solely responsible for ERM implementation, which could undermine
cost-beneﬁt effectiveness.
Our ﬁndings validate that CRO tends to undertake risk management
activities primarily for CFO. In addition, the integration of Information
Technology into internal control, data management and other compli-
ance activities pose a potential conﬂict between CRO and CFO. We argue
that CFO roles are beyond traditional compliance and risk mitigation
endeavours as they have the characteristics to actively lead organiza-
tional ERM initiatives. Therefore, CFOs should be allowed to contribute
strongly on some speciﬁc aspects of ERM initiatives namely identiﬁcation
and analysis of key risk indicators, the ﬁnancial implication of risks and
integration of ERM into traditional ﬁnance activities.
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